Annotation

1. Full citation.
Vogel, David. The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States. Princeton [N.J.: Princeton UP, 2012. Print.

2. Where did/does the author work, what else has s/he written about, and what are her/his credentials?
David Vogel is professor at the Haas School of Business and in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. His books include The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility.

3. What are the topics of the text?
This chapter further describes and explains the trend away from regulatory stringency in the US and toward in the EU - through how policy makers assess and manage risks

4. What is the main argument of the text?
There is nothing "European" about the precautionary principle - it just became less influential in the US and more so in the EU (EU also had a constant strain of major accidents that kept the public's attention on stricter regulations). Also, although the precautionary principle has not been applied consistently and its application remains controversial, it has played an important role in making EU risk regulations more stringent than US ones. It has also made European decision makers both more able and willing to respond to highly risk-averse public preferences than their American counterparts.

5. Describe at least three ways that the argument is supported.
  • The US experienced an influential backlash that questioned the rationale behind many of the highly risk averse regulations it had previously adopted, claiming that many were false positive policy errors. This weakened the political credibility of new risk claims as well as the willingness of policy makers to enact more stringent regulations in response to them (cost benefit analysis), while in the EU its impact was linked to several regulatory policy failures (false negatives). These in turn diminished public confidence in the capacity of scientific risk assessments to adequately identify threats to public health, safety, and environmental quality
  • Public opinion may be influenced by media/fears, but they should still be a legitimate role in policy making: in the case of genetically modified foods - Germans don't care what research shows - they do not want it and that is respected - maybe even a "culture of fear"? -> Challenge to the precautionary principle
  • Not all EU risk regulations hav been shaped by the precautionary principle - drug approval for example. Instead it is based on wide discretion in deciding how and when to apply it (including when to ignore, when to defer to scientific risk assessments, and when to adopt more stringent regulations than advised by scientific advisory bodies). Ex: 2010 Gowan case.

6. What three quotes capture the message of the text?
  • Stephen Breyer... argued that poorly informed-and media inflamed-public fears about trivial or non-existent risks had led to an expensive mis-allocation of regulatory resources. He urged policy makers to place much greater trust in the advice of informed experts in deciding which risks to regulate as well as how stringently to regulate them. (p 263)
  • ...the precautionary principle approaches the role of public preferences in shaping risk management decisions differently: it endorses the view that they should be accorded a legitimate policy role ... as a response to public fears, concerns, or, in some cases, values. Precautionary measures... are most likely to be applied when public opinion is instinctively or knowledgeably risk-averse. (p 278)
  • The influence of the precautionary principle in Europe reflects both increased public pressures for more risk stringent regulations and the greater willingness of policy makers to respond to them, while the increased reliance on regulatory risk assessments in the United States is linked to a decline in public and political support for further expansion of risk regulation. (p 278)

7. What three questions about environmental risk and precaution does this article leave you with?
  • How much power should public opinion have when discussing or creating policies regarding risk and regulation? How are their voices heard?
  • What other ways, besides the media, does the public have to hear about risks? How effective are these channels?
  • What are the checks and balances in place to keep policy regulators from making bad/misinformed decisions? Are there any other case studies, besides the blood contamination test in France, where the precautionary principle has failed?

8. What three points, details or references from the text did you follow up on to advance your perspective on environmental risk and precaution? (Provide citations, with a brief explanation of what you learned. One of these should be fully annotated, as your second required reading for each week.)
  • Wildavsky, Aaron B. Searching for safety. New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 1988. Print.
    I looked up what the book was about and it is written for people concerned with risk, technology, health, safety, environmental protection, regulation, and analysis of systems for making decisions. It also explains how and why risk taking makes life safer and looks into how different organisms cope with danger. The author's purpose is to shift the risk debate from passive prevention of harm to active search for safety.
  • Alemanno, Alberto. "The Gowan Judgment: Celebrating the EU Risk Regulation Paradigm for Decision-making." Alberto Alemanno. Alberto Alemanno, 28 Dec. 2010. Web. 18 Apr. 2013. <http://albertoalemanno.eu/articles/43875>.
    I looked up the 2010 Gowan case mentioned in the book with regards to EU's discretionary risk regulation. Gowan, a Portuguese company that triggered the authorization procedure for fenarimol, sought the annulment of two Italian decrees complying with Directive 2006/134 before Tribunale Amministrativo del Lazio (TAR). Gowan pleaded the illegality of this Directive. In essence, it submitted that the severe restrictions on the use of this substance were not justified by the scientific studies carried out in the course of the assessment procedure foreseen by the plant protection products directive. Ruling: Since none of the evaluation requirements foreseen in this directive contain specific criteria for the assessment of the effects of an active substance on the endocrine system and these effects are covered by the general 'harmful effects on human' criterion, no breach of the principle of legal certainty can be found.
    Also, word for word from the Vogel book: "On December 22 2010, the European Courts delivered their most important risk regulation judgment since Pfizer."
  • "OpenJurist." 514 F2d 492 Reserve Mining Company v. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA, 1975. Web. 18 Apr. 2013. <http://openjurist.org/514/f2d/492/reserve-mining-company-v-environmental-protection-agency>.
    I looked up the Reserve Mining vs EPA Supreme Court case.
    Reserve Mining v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), is a classic early risk management case. Reserve was mining low-grade iron ore (taconite) in Minnesota and processing it into iron-rich pellets at facilities bordering Lake Superior. The residues of this process were the discharge of taconite tailings into Lake Superior and the emission of taconite particles into the air near several Minnesota towns. (It was proven at the trial that taconite is structurally identical to amosite asbestos.) In light of seemingly dramatic risks to public health, but also of the profound uncertainties in the epidemiological and toxicological evidence regarding the toxicity of taconite, the court ordered Reserve to cease its water discharge “within a reasonable time” and to “promptly...use such available technology as will reduce the asbestos fiber count in the ambient air...below a medically significant level.”Asbestos, however, is a zero-tolerance carcinogen — one exposure can trigger mortal disease — so the court’s risk standard is ambiguous. Reserve moved to land disposal of tailings in 1980 and closed down several years later, not because of burdensome pollution control requirements but because of the general decline of the U.S. steel industry in the face of foreign competition.